

UC-NRLF



B 3 023 734

51591-0511

LB

1705

U6

no. 1-17

MAIN

LB-705

L6 Ed/Bych

TEACHERS' LEAFLET No. 1, 1917.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

U. S. BUREAU OF EDUCATION



OPPORTUNITIES FOR HISTORY TEACHERS. 1917-

THE LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR IN THE CLASSROOM.

BY THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE.

INTRODUCTION.

This leaflet, prepared for the use of teachers of history by the National Board for Historical Service, does not attempt to discuss the relative importance of the various fields of history in the school curriculum, nor to deal with problems of pedagogical method, nor to furnish its readers with ready-made views on contemporary events. Its primary purpose is to suggest certain aspects of history, ancient and modern, which have gained a new interest in the light of the Great War, especially since America itself has become one of the belligerent powers. The necessarily brief and general suggestions here offered will be worked out in greater detail in a series of articles, also prepared under the auspices of this board, for the History Teacher's Magazine. Suggestions and inquiries from teachers will be cordially welcomed. They should be addressed to The National Board for Historical Service, 1133 Woodward Building, Washington, D. C.

The articles on the special fields of history were prepared by the chairmen of the four committees listed below, under the general editorial supervision of the board, in consultation with their colleagues but without imposing on the latter any responsibility for the specific opinions expressed.

COMMITTEES.

Ancient History: R. V. D. Magoffin, chairman, J. H. Breasted, S. P. R. Chadwick, W. S. Davis, W. S. Ferguson, A. T. Olmstead, W. L. Westermann.
 Medieval and Modern European History: D. C. Munro, chairman, F. M. Anderson, A. I. Andrews, S. B. Harding, D. C. Knowlton, Margaret McGill.
 English History: A. L. Cross, chairman, Wayland J. Chase, E. P. Cheyney, Blanche E. Hazard, L. M. Larson, Wallace Notestein.
 American History: E. B. Greene, chairman, W. L. Fleming, R. A. Maurer, F. L. Paxson, T. S. Smith, James Sullivan, E. M. Violette.

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS.

The American teacher of history in this autumn of 1917 is planning his work under conditions at once perplexing and inspiring. The Nation of which he is a part has finally been drawn into a great war—a war which demands for its successful prosecution not only efficient and courageous service in the Army and Navy but the loyal cooperation of millions of men and women who are not enrolled in the fighting forces nor directly responsible for the civil administration on which those forces depend. Many teachers have already answered the call to the colors; others will doubtless find opportunities for service in the Red Cross or other forms of relief work. For all of these the war will mean giving up special professional as well as personal interests to that fundamental obligation which rests upon the citizen, as a citizen, to share in the national defense. The best that can be done for these friends and colleagues is to bid them a hearty Godspeed and a pledge of unflinching support in the cause for which they have offered their lives.

But what of those who remain at work in their customary places in the kind of service for which they have been prepared by previous training and experience? Does the war bring to them any special opportunity or obligation? The question will be answered by different persons in different ways, but there are a few propositions on which all can probably agree, more easily perhaps in theory than in practice.

First of all, perhaps, comes the duty of keeping, for teacher and for pupil, the habit of at least trying to see things as they really were and are. This is not easy at any time; it is peculiarly difficult at such a time as this, when to many people a slight distortion of facts may even seem a patriotic duty. Aggressive sovereigns like Louis XIV and Frederick the Great were usually able to find loyal subjects who could produce legal and historical arguments in support of policies already put into effect by their armies in the field. Similar things have happened in the present war and since history teachers are not less human than their fellow-citizens, they must all be on their guard against this mistaken view of patriotic duty. In the long run loyalty to the country, as well as loyalty to history, is best served by looking the facts squarely in the face.

Admitting that misguided patriots may abuse history, it does not follow that there is no proper relation between history and patriotism. There are many formal definitions of history, but most of them assume that it has to do primarily with the corporate or social life of men. History, properly studied or taught, is constantly reminding the individual of the larger life of the community, which was shaped for good or ill by countless generations of those who have lived be-

fore, determines our own thinking and acting in various and often mysterious ways, and will continue long after we are gone. This common life and the ideals which guide it have been built up through the sacrifice of individual interests in the past, and it is only by such sacrifices in the present that this generation can do its part in the continuing life of the local community, the State, and the Nation. In normal times of peace this obvious historical fact seems like many others in the books, true no doubt but less real and compelling than the struggle for individual existence and individual success. When war comes with its demand for heavy sacrifice, even of life itself, in defense of national ideals, success or failure for the Nation may turn very largely on the proportion of its citizens in whom this essentially historical conception of their membership in a continuing community, more important than their own individual fortunes, has become a real motive force. Here is the common ground on which history and patriotism meet.

This quickening of the community spirit is not the only way in which the history teacher may serve the Nation. War is a peculiar kind of national experience, an experience through which this Nation, like every other since the beginnings of recorded history, has had to pass from time to time. The great contest in which we have now to take our part is indeed different in many ways from any war that the world has ever known before, different in the immense scale on which it is carried on, in its enormous destruction of property, and in its appalling cost in human life; different also in its new kinds of warfare, the airship, the submarine, and all the diabolically clever applications of science to the destruction of human life and the monuments of human civilization. Yet, in their fundamental aspects, all wars have much in common and bring certain inevitable experiences and problems, for which all must be prepared.

Every great war, for instance, is fought not merely by armies and navies, but by the governments at home which direct the fighting forces. When war comes, especially in a peaceful nation like this, all the machinery of government is suddenly forced to perform new duties for which it is largely unprepared and to exercise extraordinary powers not necessary nor desirable in time of peace. The people who manage it, being human, inevitably make mistakes, and sometimes the right decision may seem to be the wrong one. A promising general may turn out badly, or a good man may fail because of conditions for which he is in no way responsible. Under such circumstances the teacher of history may help to steady public opinion against superficial judgments of men or hasty conclusions as to the course of events. A study of the Civil War should be suggestive in this respect. In the summer of 1864 many distinguished and patriotic Americans believed and said that the war was a failure, and

Horace Greeley was so discouraged that he was ready for peace "at almost any price." That was less than a year before the final victory at Appomattox and only a few months before the advance of the western armies made that victory practically certain. When such moments of depression come again or the scarcely less dangerous moments of easy-going optimism, the teacher should be able to supply the larger and truer perspective, which is one of the best results of historical study.

War means sooner or later higher taxes and there is always the old problem how much of this burden should be borne now and how much should be left to the future. War generally brings high prices, with abnormal prosperity for some classes and excessive hardships for others. Some of these evils may be lessened by thinking of them in advance; others may be less keenly felt if, as the financial writers say, they are discounted before they actually happen. The best illustrations of these things may be found in such great modern conflicts as the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, and our own Civil War; but even in ancient times armies had to "move on their bellies," and military operations were less simple than they seem in the textbooks.

The training of young people, and of the parents through their pupils, to take an intelligent part in the decision of public questions is important enough at any time; but it is peculiarly so in this war whose meaning for the individual citizen is not so easily brought home. In 1823 and 1824, when the Monroe doctrine was under discussion, Daniel Webster referred to the people who thought that Americans had no interest in the European system of mutual insurance for hereditary rulers against popular movements. What, he said, have we to do with Europe? "The thunder, it may be said, rolls at a distance. The wide Atlantic is between us and danger; and however others may suffer, we shall remain safe." Webster's answer to this question was strikingly similar to some of the utterances of President Wilson: "I think it is a sufficient answer to this to say, that we are one of the nations of the earth. * * * We have as clear an interest in international law as individuals have in the laws of society." That was said long before the steamship, the ocean cable, the submarine, and the wireless had broken down still further our "splendid isolation." To-day we are fighting for our own rights, but over and above those special rights of our own we are fighting for international law itself, without which no nation can be safe, least of all those democratic governments which are less effectively organized for war than for peace.

No one can take an intelligent part in a great conflict for the safety of democracy under an orderly system of international law unless he is really interested in and knows something about other

nations than his own—about the difference between a republican government like our own or that of France or the scarcely less democratic constitution of Great Britain on the one side, and, in sharp contrast to all of these, a strongly monarchical system like that of the German Empire, in which the most important measures affecting the national welfare may be practically determined by a single hereditary sovereign or a small group of such sovereigns. There is a story of a well-known politician, who asked, when something was said about conditions abroad, "What have we to do with abroad?" That is the conscious or unconscious attitude of too many Americans, the sort of indifferent provincialism which must be overcome if we are to escape serious disaster.

It is necessary not only to know something about the history of foreign nations, but to understand particularly our relations with some of the more important of them. For instance, how do the ideas of competent scholars about the causes of the American Revolution compare with those of the old-fashioned Fourth of July orator? What changes in the British Government and in British policy have taken place during the past half century which have a bearing on our present relations with that Government? What have been our relations with France since the days of Franklin and Lafayette? How have the interests and policies of the German Empire in the Western Hemisphere and in Asia during the past quarter century affected those of the United States? Has our traditional sense of responsibility for the protection of American Republics under the Monroe doctrine prepared us in any way for the responsibilities assumed in the present war? Do Americans have any important connections with the Turkish Empire or with China? Washington's views on foreign policy have often been inaccurately stated; what did he actually say in his Farewell Address about temporary, as distinguished from permanent, alliances?

These questions have been taken from the modern history of Europe and the United States, but in the following pages of this leaflet others will be suggested in the four principal fields of history commonly taught in American schools. There is some connection between the conditions which made the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates one of the great seats of ancient civilization and those which are making Mesopotamia to-day one of the chief theaters of the Great War; between the Byzantine Empire of the Middle Ages and the struggle for the control of Constantinople which has been going on in the past few years. How do the imperialistic ambitions of the present compare with those of ancient Rome or its medieval successor, the Holy Roman Empire? The teacher who knows how to stir interest in these connections, which are not really so remote as they often seem, will not only be enriching the lives of his indi-

vidual pupils, but he will be helping the American people to take an intelligent part in the new responsibilities to which they have been called, responsibilities which look beyond the clash of arms to the establishment of a better international order, a real society of nations.

ANCIENT HISTORY.

During the past few years many people have favored a decided reduction of the time given to ancient history in our schools in order to leave more space for the later periods which seem to have a closer, more vital relation to contemporary life. It is natural that this way of thinking should be still further encouraged by the Great War, for the understanding of which a thorough study of modern history, and especially of the nineteenth century, is quite essential. This is not the place for a new "battle of the books," to fight over again the old debate between the "ancients" and the "moderns"; but, even in these stirring times, there are reasons why we may turn to ancient history with fresh interest.

The outbreak of the present war was preceded by a notable period of archæological discovery in Greece, in Egypt, and in the Mesopotamian valleys. Through the work of these modern explorers, many of them Americans, a large part of ancient history is being rewritten and in a way to bring out more clearly than ever before the real life of peoples who had previously been little more than mere names, even to serious students. Some of these old documents, like the great Babylonian Code of Hammurapi, inscribed on stone 4,000 years ago, "the oldest preserved code of ancient law," or the newly discovered Assyrian letters, make us wonder whether, with all the surface differences between those civilizations and our own, the deeper human problems which we share with them are not equally important.

For some, at least, this terrible catastrophe of the European war with its wholesale destruction of the finest products of human civilization, its life-and-death struggle between opposing nations and opposing ideals, has seemed a reason for thinking, not less but more of the great mysterious forces which brought about the rise and decline of the ancient empires whose political and social systems probably seemed to them as secure as our own does to us. War has a surprising way, too, of breaking down many of the conventions and surface peculiarities which seem to distinguish one epoch from another, throwing into sharp relief those human needs and passions which belong to men as men in every age, and so bringing us nearer to the ancient primitive experiences of the race.

Of course, the war has also affected the study of ancient history by turning men's minds to certain regions which were the starting point of the whole western civilization. No one can follow the war

intelligently from week to week without keeping in his mind at least a rough map of the lands about the Mediterranean Sea. There are many events of ancient times in Egypt, in the "Near East," and in other Mediterranean lands, which with all their differences have enough of likeness to things now happening to excite interest and stimulate inquiry. Great campaigns are again carried on where Xenophon marched with his famous "Ten Thousand," where Alexander the Great led his armies to the conquest of the East, where Cæsar, Trajan, and Marcus Aurelius raised the Roman eagles. It is worth while to compare the recent movements against Syria-Palestine with the ancient attacks on Gaza and Jerusalem, the hidden lairs of the Cilician pirates with the submarine bases of the present war, the tragic failure of the Athenians at Aegospotami with that of the Allies at Gallipoli. Indeed, there are very few present movements in the Mediterranean Basin which may not in some way help to enliven the study of ancient history.

There is romance in the frequent stories of archæological finds in the deep-dug trenches. In the movements, especially of some of the small nations, there may be seen still working mysterious survivals of ancient feuds, religious rivalries, and national aspirations. Modern Greece, with its complex mingling of different races, still finds a real stimulus to national pride in keeping up with some modifications the language of classical times, and in remembering the great achievements of the old Hellenic peoples. To the north, the Roumanians, speaking a language of Latin derivation, like to think of themselves as descendants of the Roman soldier-colonists in the time of the Emperor Trajan.

The important work done recently in Egyptian history and archæology makes possible now a new and more vivid presentation of the influence which Egypt had on the art and culture of ancient times. It was not known until lately how many things for which other peoples and lands have had the credit really originated in that wonderful land which long ago with a pretty conceit was truthfully called the "gift of the Nile." In the dynastic changes which took place there, in the ascendancies of the priestly and military classes, much food may be found for reflection on court intrigues, on economic disturbances, and on foreign politics. Some interesting opportunities are presented here for comparison of past and present conditions. It is natural, for example, to ask how the life of the peasants in the Nile Valley under the modern British protectorate compares with that of their ancestors in the days of the "Old Kingdom" from four to five thousand years ago. This is one illustration of the kind of questions which can be much more fully answered now with the new material recently brought to light than they could have been answered fifty years ago.

Asia Minor and the Tigris-Euphrates world will now become more than mere names, for the Lydians and the Hittites, the Assyrians and the Babylonians, have come out of the realm of Biblical and poetical nomenclature, and have taken on flesh and blood. The shock of Megiddo, the thunderous charge of Macedonian cavalry, Jewish religion, Babylonian astrology and architecture, and the mysteries of Asia Minor will take on new interest in the light of the modern drama now being enacted on that same stage. It is easier now to appreciate the importance of that high-lying plateau over which the Persian hosts surged against Hellas, to be rolled back finally by the impetuous genius of Alexander the Great; it is easier to follow the inroad of that Gallic tribe whose defeat was a stimulus to the Pergamene school of Hellenistic art, and whose later condition called forth St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. Perhaps there may be yet another knot at the old Phrygian city of Gordium. Modern interest in the Berlin-Bagdad railway project, which aims to connect the Baltic and the North Sea with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, naturally sets the student of ancient history to thinking about the old trade routes which from time immemorial ran from Asia Minor and Syria through the Tigris and Euphrates valleys.

It is now possible to throw new light on the extent and purpose of Greek colonization and on the value of the Hellenistic period. There is a world of inference to be drawn from the expansion of Greek commerce. The wing-sandaled Hermes carried a money bag, but he also carried a wand, which may have been intended to show that his side line was conducting souls to Hades. The early Greek had a firm scorn for the barbarian, but the logic of events brought the Hellenistic Greek to something like the point of view of modern cosmopolitanism. Suggestions may be drawn from the struggle between autocratic Sparta and democratic Athens, and at this time of strife particular stress may be laid on the peaceful arts which have enshrined the name of Greece in the hearts of mankind. Much is to be learned in politics by studying the development of Greek institutions, and it ought not to be difficult to explain why the political aspirations of contemporary Greece, sentimental from the American point of view, are matters of real and vital moment to the people there. The history of Byzantium and the ethnology of the Balkans belong to this field; there are numerous opportunities for the teacher to explain the international importance of Constantinople and the religious, racial, and political animosities of the Balkan peoples.

Italy and the early Roman world are examples of the rise and spread of a dominant power, the break-up successively of a kingdom, a republic, and an empire; and show the real, perhaps also the psychological influence of a senatorial and imperial Rome, of a Christian Rome, of a legal-minded Rome. There are many tales of patriot

self-sacrifice and devotion among the Romans, the recital of which can not fail to make for character if didactic sentimentalism is carefully avoided. Scores of events in the first century B. C.—that last century of the great Roman Republic—have much resemblance to present-day events, and have been sedulously and seductively drawn as deadly parallels. The perspective must be enlarged and the background must show all the facts or the ugly likenesses will overshadow the picture, and the many differences will lose their beauty and their true meaning. The French and Belgian border was a debatable land in Roman as in present times, as Caesar's Commentaries show; the characters, the ideals, and the ambitions of the peoples in Europe—France, England, and Germany—were interesting then as they are now. The period of the Roman Empire is crowded with events that are full of meaning even for the most casual reader, whether his chief interest is in social and religious conditions, in political and legal institutions, or in world politics.

It can not be denied that in appealing to the quickened interest which comes from the comparison of ancient and modern conditions there is a certain danger. Here, perhaps, more than in any other field of history the teacher is tempted to indulge in the kind of discussion which assumes that he can draw from the rise and fall of ancient empires conclusions as clean-cut and definite as those to be gained from an experiment in physics. After all, human society is such a complicated thing that history never does exactly repeat itself. Remembering, for instance, that scholars do not at all agree as to what caused the "decay" of the old Græco-Roman civilization, it is necessary to be on guard against superficial and misleading parallels and against the common assumption that certain characteristics of modern society indicate a similar decadence in our own time.

To take advantage of these points of contact between ancient and modern life without distorting the view of either is, therefore, not an easy thing. The teacher of ancient history who tries to do it must also know something about the modern field, but if he really cares for his work, it offers a prospect of keen interest and of real service as well.

MEDIEVAL AND MODERN EUROPE.

The present war has brought a peculiar opportunity to American teachers of European history, and at the same time it has laid upon them a great responsibility. Their subject is more vital to Americans than ever before. By proper selection and emphasis of topics, they can instruct their pupils so that they will have a better understanding of present-day conditions and therefore of the reasons why the United States is taking part in the war. Through the pupils

they will reach many parents, and if the teaching is sound, they may be an effective factor in the country's political development. Two dangers, in particular, must be avoided. In the first place, the war has not changed history; the methods of treatment and presentation that have proved to be sound in the past are not necessarily to be abandoned. In the second place, and as a corollary of the first, the teacher needs to be on guard against the perversion of history in the interest of any particular creed, whether that creed be pacifism or militarism, nationalism or internationalism. He should not follow the German practice which has used the teaching of history in the public schools as a means for inculcating "love of the reigning Hohenzollern family" and the "need of a strong navy."

While history and the purposes in teaching it have not changed, the scope of our interests has broadened, and because of the events of the present war it is possible to understand some historical facts more fully. It is well known, to all teachers at least, that in any course in history, either in school or college, only an outline can be attempted and only a very small percentage of the important facts in any field can be taught. While not neglecting any of the supremely important issues, it is possible to choose new facts to illustrate them; and those especially which are of immediate interest because of the present war may well be chosen.

In the past, naturally, the methods of presentation and the choice of topics have been determined to a great extent by traditionalism and by a somewhat narrow provincialism. It has become traditional in the nineteenth century to trace the course of events as it led up to the war of 1870, the formation of the German Empire, and the unification of Italy; the later history was not presented so fully, and too frequently consisted merely of a series of interesting or important events, arranged chronologically or geographically, but without any logical nexus. Consequently, too little attention has usually been given to such more recent events as the Congress of Berlin and its results. Now it is imperative that the history should be so taught as to explain the causes, both remote and immediate, which brought about the present war. Furthermore, because of the tendency to stress events prior to 1870, and because of the feeling up to the present time of America's comparative isolation, the history of eastern Europe and of Asia has been almost entirely neglected. The opportunity must now be seized to study the whole of Europe and its influence on and connections with the rest of the world; and the influence of America upon Europe, especially in the past century, must be brought out.

Ethnographic conditions are of great importance for the understanding of conditions in eastern Europe as well as in western Europe. Textbooks have always given sufficient space to the early

Germans and even some to the Huns, although they have left some doubt in regard to the later history of the latter. Now, it is apparent that the Slavs should have attention commensurate with their importance in the world and to the people of the United States. Educated men constantly make blunders because they can not appreciate the difference between Poles, Lithuanians, Czechs, and Little Russians. They would consider it absurd not to differentiate between Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans, and Spaniards; but the one confusion is almost as bad as the other. At least the fundamental facts concerning the origin and distribution of the Slavs should be taught. More attention must be given to Russian history and institutions. The Byzantine and Tartar influences which made Russia's development so different from that of the western nations must be explained. The possibilities of the success of the revolution in Russia can be better understood if something is known of the early Russian "mir" and its relation to the villages and manors of the west. The self-government of the early Russian cities, their trade with the Hansa, and the reasons for their downfall are important. These are merely illustrations, from one field, of old and too commonly neglected facts which have been made more significant by the present war.

There is another subject not so seriously neglected as those first mentioned, which Americans ought to understand much better; that is the history of modern Germany. We are now at war with the German Empire, and the controlling factor in that Empire is Prussia, whose King is ex officio German Emperor. The character of this Prussian State, the most powerful military organization that the world has ever known, can not possibly be understood without a careful study of its history, especially during the past 300 years.

The starting point and still the central principle of the Prussian State is the reigning dynasty of Hohenzollern. The history of this dynasty and its policies since the seventeenth century should therefore be studied with special care. A few topics are suggested for emphasis: The doctrine of divine right, not peculiar to this dynasty, in recent times has been most frequently emphasized by the present King and Emperor; the gradual building up of the State about the army in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, beginning at a time when the prince and his army formed almost the only bond of union between his scattered domains; the use of that increasingly effective military machine for purposes of conquest, especially by Frederick the Great at the expense of Austria and Poland, and by William I, under the guidance of Bismarck, at the expense of Denmark, Hanover, Austria, and France; the largely unsuccessful effort made in 1848 to liberalize the Government of Prussia, and to organize a United Germany on the same liberal principles; the skillful methods by which, under parliamentary forms, the real control of the Prussian and German Governments remains in the hands of the Prussian

King and a comparatively small ruling class in that Kingdom, consisting of the Junkerthum or landed gentry and a few financial magnates.

Even with comparatively young pupils it may be shown how modern German thinkers have emphasized the ancient Greek and Roman idea of the state, using it to secure unquestioning obedience to a sovereignty which rests not upon the popular will but upon hereditary right and military force. Lastly, some account should be given of the way in which the ruling class in Prussia has been able to use science, modern business methods, and social legislation in the service of the military state—a state of which Mirabeau said more than a century ago that its chief national industry was war. A knowledge of these facts is absolutely essential to an understanding of the war and of America's share in it. No one who is ignorant of them can pretend to be doing his part as an intelligent citizen in the present crisis.

The inclusion of new topics and the increased attention given to others will necessarily take time from some of those which have customarily been treated. It is imperative that each textbook maker and each teacher consider carefully what can be omitted with the least loss. The actual content of the course may well vary from year to year, and be determined by fuller understanding and knowledge as to which facts in the past were really the most influential. Such fundamental subjects, however, as the Empire of Charles the Great; feudalism; the Crusades; the constitutional and political development in England, France, Germany, and Switzerland; the Reformation; the French Revolution; the Congress of Vienna; the formation of the German Empire; the unification of Italy, etc. should not be neglected. In treating these and similar topics, subjects temporarily, and perhaps permanently, prominent may often be used as illustrations, for example, the history of Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, Greece, and the Balkan States. And in teaching these subjects, differences in development must be considered and international relations must be stressed. In teaching modern history colonies and their reactions upon the mother countries must be treated more fully, and the effects of emigration from Europe must be brought out.

The present crisis has revealed as never before the importance of contrasting ideals. In the recent past, mainly through German influence, there has been a tendency on the part of some scholars to explain history almost exclusively in terms of economic factors. It is of course, important to bring out the underlying ideals which made such factors so important in some periods and in some countries. But it is at least equally important to develop the significance of non-economic factors which have shaped the higher civilization of the

world. In short, all important phases of human activity must be studied. The people and not the monarchs should be made the center of interest. The growth of democracy has long been, with many teachers, a central theme in the study of European history, and the present war gives increased certainty to the correctness of their practice in this matter. A few years ago a very able and liberal-minded historian wrote a book in which he expressed the opinion that European interest in republican forms of government was losing rather than gaining ground. Recent events, especially in Russia, show that republicanism is more of a force even in Europe than was generally supposed.

Without lowering the standard of historical teaching, without omitting anything of real importance, without in any way sacrificing the truth, the teacher who has a vision of what history actually stands for has now an opportunity to make this subject the most vital in the education of the coming generation.

ENGLISH HISTORY.

The field in which the very roots of American institutions are embedded should be an indispensable study for every future American citizen. As a subject for study in the secondary schools, English history has many manifest advantages as well as pressing claims. This vast and hospitable country is peopled by descendants of the most diverse races and nations, but the tradition of government can citizen. As a subject for study in the secondary schools, English tradition based on primitive Germanic ideas modified and supplemented to meet the needs of a growing progressive civilization. Bearing this in mind it would be well to recall briefly the features of English institutional progress which call for emphasis as the common heritage of English-speaking peoples. They should enter into the training of American citizens in order to make clear the principles for which we and our allies are contending—the principles which may be the foundation of a future brotherhood of nations.

While the Angles, Jutes, and Saxons brought to Britain strong notions of individual freedom, and local self-government, they lacked the capacity for central organization which is an essential factor in laying the foundation of well-ordered national liberty. This was brought from Normandy by William the Conqueror, and incorporated into the English system by him and his sons. His great grandson, Henry II, introduced that wonderful common law which, even to-day, forms the basis of the legal system of the British Empire, and of the United States as well; likewise he brought into general use the jury, a development of the administrative procedure of Charlemagne and his successors. Curiously enough, these free

institutions were the gifts of half-foreign despotic kings, who ruled with an iron hand, while continental states, where absolutism afterwards found a more persistent abode, were still weak and divided, with most of the properly royal functions exercised by aspiring feudal lords. Unrestricted prerogative, however, did not survive in England more than a generation after the passing of Henry II. During the reign of his youngest son, John, came a constitutional crisis which bore enduring fruit. Magna Charta, to be sure, was the work of a body of barons primarily aiming to preserve feudal privileges, but it had the notable result of limiting the powers of the crown, and came in consequence of centuries of interpretation to be regarded as the cornerstone of English popular liberty. Among other things it raised a problem which governments are still striving to solve—how to combine centralized efficiency with a proper regard for individual liberty. Under a wise, strong monarch, Magna Charta might have become a dead letter. Fortunately for the cause of progress Henry III proved weak and addicted to foreign favorites, which kept the baronial opposition alive, with two significant results: Magna Charta was so frequently confirmed that its provisions, much extended from their original purpose, became securely rooted in the English constitution, and a representative assembly was created, which in the course of time replaced the barons as the custodian of national interests distinct from those of the crown. In this respect it developed in marked contrast to the estates general of the Continent. It should be remembered, in passing, that by a strange paradox Simon de Montfort, the leader in the national anti-monarchical struggle against Henry III, and one of the master builders, if not the founder, of parliament, was a French adventurer whom circumstances made an English patriot.

The attempt to substitute a baronial oligarchy for a royal despotism failed; but the precedent for a constitutional monarchy was established in the fateful thirteenth century. Edward I recognized many of the restrictions which had been imposed upon the royal power, and, preserving and perfecting what was best in the contributions of Henry II, laid the ground plan of the English constitution as it exists to-day. Some gains were made during the fourteenth century, but the tyranny and self-seeking of Edward's successors provoked another crisis which came to a head under the weak and capricious Richard II. The "constitutional experiment" of the Lancastrians which followed proved premature. Yet it provided further valuable precedents for the future. Three centuries later the Puritan Revolution established the principle—more than a hundred years before the French Revolution—that in cases of conflict between the crown and parliament the representative body should prevail. This

result was achieved in England at a time when royal despotism was reaching its height in other European countries. England's achievement, however, set an example which was widely followed in the European world when conditions became ripe for action. The ideas propounded in the debates in the Army Council, in Cromwell's time, formulated and developed by Hobbes and Locke, exercised a profound influence on the speculations of the philosophers who furnished the intellectual stimulus for the French Revolution.

At the Restoration the majority of Englishmen turned their backs on the work of the Puritan extremists; but the restored monarchy was never again an absolutism in the old sense and the Church of England never recovered its all-embracing sway. Moreover, the rash attempts of James II to bring about an ecclesiastico-political reaction resulted in a new revolution, which, though bloodless, preserved so effectually the fruits of the earlier conflicts that there has never since been civil war on English soil. In order most effectively to exercise the parliamentary supremacy which had been secured, the system of cabinet and party government was devised, a system which has been taken as a model by several European states during the past century. The growth of the English party system has had an important bearing on Anglo-American relations. Many of the English Whigs were staunch supporters of the cause of the Colonies in their revolt from the mother country. During the American Civil War, while the English Tories and the leaders of both English parties were coldly neutral or strongly in sympathy with the South, the great mass of the manufacturing classes in the midlands, in spite of great sacrifice on their part, stood firmly by the North and the cause of the Union. Since the second Reform Bill, in 1867, which extended the vote to the artisan classes in the towns, England, except for a few inevitable points of friction adjusted by arbitration, has been extremely well disposed toward the United States, and at the time of the Spanish-American War was our chief European friend. It should be borne in mind, too, that our Monroe doctrine owes much to Canning's support, and that the liberal leaders, Palmerston and Russell, if not always by the most gracious methods, were ever valiant supporters of national liberty and unity in European affairs.

In consequence of the American Revolution, in which we owed so much to France, the industrial revolution and the economic teachings of Adam Smith, England was the first European country to give up the notion that colonies existed primarily for purposes of exploitation. As a result of Lord Durham's sagacious and epoch-making report, occasioned by the Canadian Rebellion, self-government has been, since the middle of the nineteenth century, introduced into every

colony where conditions were ripe for it. Scarcely had the Boer War closed when self-government was restored in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. Much has been made of India and Egypt; but England only reluctantly extended her dominion in India; she refused in 1844, in 1853, and again in 1878 to take possession of Egypt. Occupation was forced on her in 1882, and a formal protectorate was declared in December, 1914. In both countries natives share in the government and administration, and recently an imperial cabinet has met which contained Indian representatives. The best commentary on British colonial administration is the loyalty with which her subjects beyond the seas have responded at crises, notably in the present war. Ireland is still unsatisfied, and although she has been oppressed and exploited in the past, sincere efforts have been made during the past half century to better her political and economic position. The difficulties of establishing a working system of government have been great, while the attitude of the Protestant industrial classes in Ulster has added a most serious complication. The Irish convention now in session offers hope.

Such are some of the political features of English history of intimate interest to Americans. In the nonpolitical field English achievement has been equally noteworthy. The industrial revolution, in many respects more far-reaching in its results than the French Revolution, took its rise in England. In humanitarian and religious reforms one can point to the names of Wycliffe, John Knox, the Wesleys, John Howard, William Wilberforce, Robert Raikes, the promoter of Sunday schools, Elizabeth Fry, Thomas Fowell Buxton, Sir George Wilkings, the founder of the Young Men's Christian Association, and Florence Nightingale. In literature, Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton are world figures, while the romantic movement owes much to England and the novel is an English product. In painting, Sir Joshua Reynolds, Turner, and Constable have exercised a world-wide influence; while Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Berkeley have made enduring contributions to speculative thought. Scientific progress owes incalculable debts to Harvey, Newton, Cavendish, Dalton, Davy, Jenner, Simpson, Lister, Faraday, Kelvin, Darwin, Huxley, and Tyndall.

In thus emphasizing England's achievements there should be no thought of belittling those of other countries and other peoples, but enough can be said to show that England has given a remarkable account of her stewardship during the long centuries of her national existence. Americans have shared in much of her heritage; they should know the long and fascinating history of American institutions from their origin in English soil, in order to labor the more intelligently and devotedly to preserve their existence.

AMERICAN HISTORY.

In view of the special problems now confronting the country and of the limited space available, this discussion is limited to two general subjects: The previous experience of the American people in war, and the history of relations of the United States with foreign nations. Even within these limits many important topics must be omitted altogether or merely suggested. Whatever is said will of course be considered simply as a basis for discussion in the classroom and out of it, rather than as a series of dogmatic assertions.

It is probable that actual participation in the war will affect the attitude of teachers toward military history, in the large sense of that term. For many years old-fashioned textbooks have been criticized for giving too much space to war and military operations, and so crowding out the less spectacular but at least equally important achievements of peace. These objections became still stronger as the belief prevailed that history is not wholly a record of governments, whether at war or peace, but that it should take more account of other forms of social activity, including industry, education, and religion. War history was considered objectionable not only because there was too much of it relatively, but also because it seemed to be so presented as to stimulate the war spirit, perpetuating popular prejudices, and suggesting to each succeeding generation that kind of patriotism which consists largely of hatred for some other nation. Besides, military historians assert that these same textbooks have done considerable damage, even from their point of view, by minimizing the weak points in America's war record and so creating a superficial and dangerous optimism about "triumphant democracy."

It must be admitted that war is one of the hard realities of the national life—one of the factors in making this Nation what it is to-day. One war, or series of wars, decided that English-speaking people should dominate the North American Continent. Another war decided that out of these English-speaking peoples should be formed a new nation, independent of the British Empire and the chief representative in the modern world of the republican ideal. Another and more terrible war answered the question whether this experiment of republican government on a great scale should fail or succeed. Repeatedly, as that conflict approached and as it went on, President Lincoln and his contemporaries had to consider whether the fearful sacrifices which it involved were too high a price to pay for the right answer to that question, and they deliberately decided that the sacrifices must be made. In these great conflicts, as in all human affairs, class interests and personal ambitions were strangely

intermingled with patriotic self-sacrifice and enthusiasm for ideals. These it is the business of the historian to examine honestly and unravel as best he may; but, whatever the hope for the future, the conviction that war may be necessary for the defense of vital principles must remain a stubborn fact of the past.

War can not be left out of American history, but that part of the record should be approached with a different perspective and a different set of questions from those of the old textbook histories. The simple problems of strategy may be suggested, and typical battles, like Yorktown and Gettysburg, may be studied in detail for purposes of illustration; but after all the citizen, young or old, needs to think most of what happens before the Army and Navy get to their stations and what has to be done at home to enable them to fight at all.

First, how have American armies been brought together? Traditional policy which reaches back into English history has opposed large standing armies. So, when a serious war comes, it finds the Nation with a very small number of disciplined soldiers and an even more serious shortage of trained officers. It has been necessary, therefore, to depend upon militia and volunteers hastily brought together. The results may be seen in Washington's letters about the militia of the Revolution, in the early battles of the War of 1812, and in the opening year of the Civil War. Finally, President Lincoln and Congress adopted the principle of compulsory service and filled the broken ranks of the Union Army with drafted men. In the short Spanish War there was no difficulty about getting volunteers, but the gathering of inexperienced men in large numbers resulted in a great waste of time and life through preventable diseases. Finally, in the present war militia and volunteers are still used, but the main dependence is on "selective conscription," the principle that the Government shall determine for the man of military age whether he can best serve the country in the Army or in some other way.

It is realized now more fully than ever before that the success of a war depends largely on men and women who never go near the firing line. There are, for instance, the officials of the Federal and State Governments. Our War of Independence may help us to appreciate the problems of the new Russian Republic, because it was fought by a government, or governments, still in process of organization. The Continental Congress was, in a sense, a big committee of the Revolutionary Whig Party, and even later the authority of the State governments was disputed by a large part of the people who lived under them. By 1812 a real constitution was in effect; but Congress and the President did not get on well together; State sovereignty doctrines and general discontent prevented the New England gov-

ernments from giving effective help. In the end politicians who sacrificed patriotism to partisan and sectional interests were discredited; but throughout the war the Government was like a poorly constructed machine in which a large part of the energy goes out in friction. The Civil War began with a new and inexperienced party in power; much of Lincoln's time was wasted with petty office seekers, and as the war went on the activity of the so-called "Copperheads" seriously embarrassed the Government.

The Civil War Government of the United States is, however, most interesting, because it shows how the President and Congress may use the war clauses of the Constitution and exercise powers unknown and undesirable in time of peace, including such extreme measures of the President as the suspension of the *writ of habeas corpus*, in order to permit arbitrary arrests and the trial of civilians by military courts without a jury. Some thought then that the Government was being converted into a military despotism. But the American people as a whole accepted Lincoln's view that all this was a temporary restriction of liberty in the permanent interests of democracy.

War is, however, the business not only of governments but of the Nation as a whole, and there are few kinds of human activity which do not have some relation to its success or failure. Washington's armies suffered because of poor transportation for food and the eagerness of contractors to get high profits. In the Civil War the expanding agriculture of the North made possible by the new farm machinery was scarcely less important than the naval blockade of the southern ports or notable victories on land. The women of the Confederacy offer an interesting study of the way in which women may keep up the usual business of life when the men are in the field. Similar activities, North and South, are suggested by what women are now asked to do in connection with the Red Cross and food control. The nearest approach in our history to that concentration of a whole people on the problem of national defense which is now going on in Europe is what happened in the South from 1861 to 1865.

There are many other problems which the teacher may find ready to his hand. For instance, how has money been raised in time of war? What use has been made of taxes, loans, and paper money, and how did these agencies work? How have wars affected profits and wages in different industries and the cost of living? These are all things which must be considered to-day, but none of them is a wholly new question.

After all, most Americans are looking beyond this war and thinking what may be done to guard against such wars in the future. We can not do our part in solving this great problem unless a large number of us, not merely experts in government and international law,

learn to think of our country not as an isolated unit but as a real member of the "society of nations," with duties to perform as well as rights to defend; and this requires a broader and more open-minded study of our foreign relations than we have yet found time for, taking care always that in discarding old prejudices we are not simply substituting new ones.

The story of our foreign relations naturally begins with the British Empire, from which we seceded in 1776. There have been numerous and varied theories as to why and how that separation came about. The British Tories and Whigs have had their say, and Americans have not agreed among themselves. It now seems safe to say this at least in the light of present-day scholarship: There is no longer any question of one side being wholly right and the other wholly wrong, but rather of an almost inevitable conflict between two equally natural aspirations, the natural American desire for self-government and the natural British desire for imperial unity. The old imperial constitution no longer fitted the new facts of American life, and there was not enough imagination and constructive thinking among the politicians at a time when only the highest kind of statesmanship could have solved the problem. Meantime, the more daring and imaginative of the colonial leaders began to find inspiration in the idea of a new and independent America. In the next century British statesmen profited by the experience and the old empire began to transform itself gradually into a commonwealth of self-governing nations.

In the process of separating from one European nation Americans allied themselves with another, and without that alliance with France independence could hardly have been won. The French Government was thinking primarily of restoring the balance of power in Europe by weakening England; but generous-minded Frenchmen, like Lafayette, were inspired by genuine enthusiasm for the American cause, so attractively presented to them by Benjamin Franklin.

The mutual sympathy of French and American liberals seemed likely, at first, to be strengthened by the Revolution of 1789; but many Americans were shocked by the Reign of Terror, and when the French Revolution developed into a general European war, most of them made up their minds that this new Government must keep out of the conflict. More and more the idea took hold of leaders like Washington and Adams and Jefferson that though temporary alliances might be necessary, the safest course was to keep American politics as separate as possible from those of Europe.

This isolation proved, however, easier to preach than to practice. After a difficult and rather unsuccessful effort to defend its neutrality against the two chief belligerents, the United States finally went to

war with one of them. As a military and naval undertaking the War of 1812 was not much of a success, but it strengthened the idea of an American system distinct from that of Europe, while the purchase of Louisiana in 1803 and Florida in 1819-1821 still further lessened the chance of European interference on this side of the Atlantic.

American satisfaction in this "splendid isolation" was soon disturbed by new and threatening possibilities. The conservative monarchies of continental Europe had formed themselves into a mutual insurance society against revolutionary or popular movements. This was primarily for Europe, but there was a chance that the same idea might be applied to the Spanish-American colonies, whose independence had lately been recognized by the United States. The Russian minister to Washington took pains to explain to Secretary Adams the beauties of this "European system." President Monroe and his friends, Jefferson and Madison, were much alarmed and considered the possibility of joining with England, then the most liberal of the Great Powers, in a declaration against the system, including not only the proposed extension of it to America but also its application in Europe. They were especially interested in the Greeks, then struggling for independence. Adams was more cautious, and so we contented ourselves with opposing the "European system" in this hemisphere, declaring, so to speak, that *America* "must be made safe for democracy."

From that time on to the close of the century, the Government adhered rather strictly to the idea of nonintervention in European affairs, as a complement to the idea of European nonintervention in America; but the notion that America stood, *in the world*, for a distinct set of political ideas, was officially expressed from time to time. Monroe himself said in his message of 1823 that America sympathized with the national aspirations of the Greeks. After 1848, the Austrian Government complained vigorously of the sympathy expressed by President Taylor and Secretary Webster for the Hungarian revolutionists. During 'the fifties America came into close touch with the radical idealists of Germany through the coming of Carl Schurz and other refugees. When France returned to republican government in 1848 and again after the Franco-Prussian War, the American Government made a special point of being the first to recognize the new republic.

During the Civil War Lincoln frequently declared that the survival of the Union, the saving of this experiment in government by the people on a large scale, was not a purely national issue; that the democracy of Europe was also interested in the outcome. He put this in a striking way in his letters to English workingmen, and their sympathy with this view helped to offset a strong element

in the ruling aristocracy which desired British intervention in favor of the Confederacy.

In the past fifty years, Lincoln's idea of the solidarity of democratic interests on both sides of the Atlantic has taken on a new meaning. In this era of the ocean steamship, the ocean cable, the wireless, and the submarine, it is becoming more and more impossible to think of America as a world by itself. The Spanish War and the occupation of the Philippines compelled a reconsideration of relations, not only with China and Japan, but also with England, Russia, and Germany, all of which had far-reaching interests in eastern Asia. Though the Monroe doctrine was still maintained, many Europeans questioned the right to do so after this new adventure in world politics, and during the Spanish War, European sympathy, outside of England, was generally with Spain. Since that time, the disturbed condition of certain Spanish-American Republics has from time to time suggested the possibility of intervention by European powers, primarily to defend their subjects, but with the chance always that intervention might end in the seizure of territory.

Though England, since the Venezuelan dispute of 1895, has increasingly realized her interest in the Monroe doctrine, the attitude of the greatest military power in Europe has been quite different. In 1902, Germany consented to arbitration with Venezuela only after President Roosevelt had threatened to send an American fleet to Venezuelan waters. To-day many Americans are asking what would happen to the Monroe doctrine, if as a result of the submarine warfare the Germans should secure a dominant position on the Atlantic Ocean, as well as on the Continent of Europe. Perhaps a study of this question may help to explain why we are fighting, partly indeed to defend international law on the high seas, but partly also to make *the world*, not merely America, "safe for democracy."



**R
T**
RETURN TO the circulation desk of any
University of California Library
or to the

NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
Bldg. 400, Richmond Field Station
University of California
Richmond, CA 94804-4698

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS

- 2-month loans may be renewed by calling (510) 642-6753
 - 1-year loans may be recharged by bringing books to NRLF
 - Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior to due date.
-

CIR
DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

SENT ON ILL

MAR 02 2000

U. C. BERKELEY

AUG 20 2001

DEC 11 2001 MAY 02 2005

U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES



C007004250

